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미공군 최초의 가변익 전투폭격기 F 111A형 Aardvark

Summary: 미공군 최초의 가변익 전투폭격기 F 111A형 Aardvark The General Dynamics F 111 is one of the most controversial aircraft that ever flew Perhaps no other aircraft before or since has been so bitterly criticized in the media It suffered a protracted development cycle in which numerous serious problems had to be identified and repaired and cost overruns came to be a serious concern Of the several thousand that had originally been planned only 562 flightworthy examples of seven different variants were completed The F 111 was the subject of protracted and bitter debates within the Congress with opponents denouncing the aircraft as a flying Edsel that was more dangerous to the US than it was to any potential enemy However after a prolonged gestation period in which many many problems had to be identified and fixed the F 111 turned out to be one of the most effective all weather interdiction aircraft in the world Although vilified by some as being an unsafe and dangerous plane the F 111 series of combat aircraft established the best safety record of any of the aircraft in the Century Series of fighters only 77 aircraft being lost in a million flying hours There was no other aircraft in service with the USAF which can carry out the F 111 s mission of precise air strikes over such long ranges in all weather conditions Although the aircraft has left USAF service it still serves with distinction with the Royal Australian Air Force and may very well continue until 2020 The history of the F 111 begins back in the late 1950s At that time the Tactical Air Command TAC of the USAF expressed a future need for a replacement for the F 100 F 101 and F 105 fighter bombers which were currently in service With this goal in mind on March 27 1958 the Air Force issued General Operational Requirement GOR Number 169 calling for Weapon System 649C which was a Mach 2+ 60 000 foot altitude all weather fighter capable of vertical and short takeoff and landing The Air Force wanted this aircraft to be ready for operational deployment by 1964 This GOR lasted only a year being cancelled on March 29 1959 because the Air Force recognized that a V STOL fighter capable of such performance was simply not feasible with the current technology On February 5 1960 the Air Force rewrote its requirements and issued System Development Requirement SDR No 17 incorporating most of the provisions of GOR 169 but eliminating the VTOL requirement It allowed the subsequent development of specific requirements for a new weapon system WS 324A The general requirements of SDR 17 were brought together into Specific Operational Requirement number 183 SOR 183 issued on June 14 1960 It called for an attack aircraft capable of achieving a Mach 2 5 performance at high altitude and a low level dash capability of Mach 1 2 It was to have a short and rough airfield performance and was to be capable of operating out of airfields as short as 3000 feet in length The low level radius was to be 800 miles including 400 miles right down on the deck at Mach 1 2 speeds In addition it was to have an unrefuelled ferry range capable of crossing the Atlantic Ocean It was to have a 1000 pound internal payload plus a lifting payload between 15 000 and 30 000 pounds The Air Force considered that a variable sweep wing and a turbofan engine would be needed to satisfy these requirements At the same time the Navy had a requirement for a two seat carrier based fleet air defense FAD fighter that would replace the McDonnell F 4 Phantom and the Vought F 8 Crusader This aircraft was to have the ability to loiter on patrol for much longer times with substantially larger and more capable air to air missiles and was to be able to meet and counter threats to the carrier group at much larger ranges Originally the Navy had planned to meet this FAD requirement with the Douglas F6D 1 Missileer The F6D 1 was a subsonic aircraft that looked a lot like a scaled up F3D Skyknight It was to be powered by two 10 000 lb s t Pratt Whitney TF30 P 2 turbofans and was to carry a three man crew pilot co pilot and weapons system operator The Missileer was to be capable of remaining on patrol for up to six hours tracking targets at long range using its powerful Hughes pulsed Doppler track while scan radar and attacking threats with its six long range Bendix XAAM 10 Eagle air to air missiles The Eagle was a massive long range air to air missile with a maximum speed of Mach 4 It was equipped with an advanced pulse Doppler active radar homer The warhead of the Eagle could be either conventional or nuclear The F6D aircraft was considered by the Navy to be too costly and too specialized and was thought to be too slow to be capable of defending itself once its missiles had been launched Consequently the F6D and its Eagle missiles were both cancelled in December of 1960 in the last waning days of the Eisenhower administration This still left the FAD requirement unfulfilled The Air Force and Navy requirements were at first sight completely different However on February 16 1961 the new Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara directed that the Services study the development of a single aircraft that would satisfy both the requirements of the Air Force s SOR 183 mission and the requirements of the Navy s FAD mission In addition McNamara wanted the aircraft to be capable of being used by the Army and the Marine Corps as a close support aircraft It was hoped that this strategy would reduce procurement costs substantially The project came to be known as the Tactical Fighter Experimental or TFX for short It did not take long for the services to convince Secretary McNamara that the close air support mission requirement could not be satisfied by the TFX and the Marine Corps and the Army were dropped from the program at an early stage However Secretary McNamara stuck doggedly to his idea of maximum commonality between USAF and Navy versions of the TFX and in June 1961 he instructed the Air Force and the Navy to work closely together to combine their requirements before issuing a joint RFP Although both the USAF and the Navy thought that this idea was completely unrealistic Secretary McNamara was the boss and they reluctantly followed orders Both the USAF and the Navy agreed that the use of variable geometry wings would be a good idea However on just almost everything else they differed substantially The Navy favored side by side seating for its FAD fighter whereas the Air Force preferred tandem seating The Navy wanted an aircraft equipped with a long range search and intercept radar having a dish 48 inches in diameter whereas the Air Force needed an aircraft equipped with a terrain following radar optimized for low altitude operations The Navy wanted an aircraft that was optimized for long loiter times at medium to high altitudes at subsonic speeds whereas the Air Force insisted on an aircraft capable of low altitude operations and supersonic dash performance Undaunted Secretary McNamara pressed forward with the project and directed that the Air Force would be the lead service for the development of a common TFX aircraft By August of 1961 the Secretary of the Navy reported to Secretary McNamara that the compromise TFX design could not meet the Navy requirements The Air Force wanted an aircraft weighing 75 000 pounds gross while the Navy wanted the gross weight to be kept below 50 000 pounds In addition carrier operational requirements necessitated that the overall length be kept below 56 feet so that it could fit aboard existing carrier elevators McNamara ordered the Navy to accept a design sized to accommodate a 36 inch radar rather than the 48 inch radar it really wanted and to accept a gross takeoff weight of 55 000 pounds On September 29 1961 a new Request For Proposals was issued to Boeing General Dynamics Lockheed Northrop Grumman McDonnell Douglas North American and Republic The Air Force s version of the TFX was to be designated F 111A with the Navy s version being designated F 111B In the spirit of commonality the Air Force and Navy versions did not carry separate designation schemes Nine responses were received in early December of 1961 Only Northrop turned down the invitation to submit a proposal In their first evaluation of the proposals on January 19 1962 the Air Force Selection Board and a Navy representative endorsed the Boeing proposal but the Air Force Council rejected the Boeing bid as requiring much more work In late January of 1962 both the Air Force and Navy agreed that none of the proposals were really acceptable but that two of them the Boeing and General Dynamics proposals warranted further study A letter contract was issued to each company requesting more design data In the spring of 1962 Boeing and General Dynamics submitted second proposals In May of 1962 both the Air Force and Navy Secretaries rejected the two contractor s second proposals for lack of sufficient data A third submission took place in late June At this time the Air Force endorsed the Boeing proposal but the Navy was unhappy with their version and refused to commit themselves A frustrated Secretary McNamara ordered a final competition for later that year on the basis of a point system for categories based on performance cost and commonality Boeing and General Dynamics resubmitted their final proposals in September of 1962 The Air Force Council the Air Force Logistics Command and the Bureau of Naval Weapons the Navy organization which had replaced the Bureau of Aeronautics in 1959 all indicated that they preferred the Boeing design but on November 24 1962 the Defense Department announced that the General Dynamics design had been selected The reason given for the selection of the General Dynamics proposal was its promised greater degree of commonality and its supposedly more realistic approach to the 미공군 최초의 가변익 전투폭격기 F 111A형 Aardvark The General Dynamics F 111 is one of the most controversial aircraft that ever flew Perhaps no other aircraft before or since has been so bitterly criticized in the media It suffered a protracted development cycle in which numerous serious problems had to be identified and repaired and cost overruns came to be a serious concern Of the several thousand that had originally been planned only 562 flightworthy examples of seven different variants were completed The F 111 was the subject of protracted and bitter debates within the Congress with opponents denouncing the aircraft as a flying Edsel that was more dangerous to the US than it was to any potential enemy However after a prolonged gestation period in which many many problems had to be identified and fixed the F 111 turned out to be one of the most effective all weather interdiction aircraft in the world Although vilified by some as being an unsafe and dangerous plane the F 111 series of combat aircraft established the best safety record of any of the aircraft in the Century Series of fighters only 77 aircraft being lost in a million flying hours There was no other aircraft in service with the USAF which can carry out the F 111 s mission of precise air strikes over such long ranges in all weather conditions Although the aircraft has left USAF service it still serves with distinction with the Royal Australian Air Force and may very well continue until 2020 The history of the F 111 begins back in the late 1950s At that time the Tactical Air Command TAC of the USAF expressed a future need for a replacement for the F 100 F 101 and F 105 fighter bombers which were currently in service With this goal in mind on March 27 1958 the Air Force issued General Operational Requirement GOR Number 169 calling for Weapon System 649C which was a Mach 2+ 60 000 foot altitude all weather fighter capable of vertical and short takeoff and landing The Air Force wanted this aircraft to be ready for operational deployment by 1964 This GOR lasted only a year being cancelled on March 29 1959 because the Air Force recognized that a V STOL fighter capable of such performance was simply not feasible with the current technology On February 5 1960 the Air Force rewrote its requirements and issued System Development Requirement SDR No 17 incorporating most of the provisions of GOR 169 but eliminating the VTOL requirement It allowed the subsequent development of specific requirements for a new weapon system WS 324A The general requirements of SDR 17 were brought together into Specific Operational Requirement number 183 SOR 183 issued on June 14 1960 It called for an attack aircraft capable of achieving a Mach 2 5 performance at high altitude and a low level dash capability of Mach 1 2 It was to have a short and rough airfield performance and was to be capable of operating out of airfields as short as 3000 feet in length The low level radius was to be 800 miles including 400 miles right down on the deck at Mach 1 2 speeds In addition it was to have an unrefuelled ferry range capable of crossing the Atlantic Ocean It was to have a 1000 pound internal payload plus a lifting payload between 15 000 and 30 000 pounds The Air Force considered that a variable sweep wing and a turbofan engine would be needed to satisfy these requirements At the same time the Navy had a requirement for a two seat carrier based fleet air defense FAD fighter that would replace the McDonnell F 4 Phantom and the Vought F 8 Crusader This aircraft was to have the ability to loiter on patrol for much longer times with substantially larger and more capable air to air missiles and was to be able to meet and counter threats to the carrier group at much larger ranges Originally the Navy had planned to meet this FAD requirement with the Douglas F6D 1 Missileer The F6D 1 was a subsonic aircraft that looked a lot like a scaled up F3D Skyknight It was to be powered by two 10 000 lb s t Pratt Whitney TF30 P 2 turbofans and was to carry a three man crew pilot co pilot and weapons system operator The Missileer was to be capable of remaining on patrol for up to six hours tracking targets at long range using its powerful Hughes pulsed Doppler track while scan radar and attacking threats with its six long range Bendix XAAM 10 Eagle air to air missiles The Eagle was a massive long range air to air missile with a maximum speed of Mach 4 It was equipped with an advanced pulse Doppler active radar homer The warhead of the Eagle could be either conventional or nuclear The F6D aircraft was considered by the Navy to be too costly and too specialized and was thought to be too slow to be capable of defending itself once its missiles had been launched Consequently the F6D and its Eagle missiles were both cancelled in December of 1960 in the last waning days of the Eisenhower administration This still left the FAD requirement unfulfilled The Air Force and Navy requirements were at first sight completely different However on February 16 1961 the new Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara directed that the Services study the development of a single aircraft that would satisfy both the requirements of the Air Force s SOR 183 mission and the requirements of the Navy s FAD mission In addition McNamara wanted the aircraft to be capable of being used by the Army and the Marine Corps as a close support aircraft It was hoped that this strategy would reduce procurement costs substantially The project came to be known as the Tactical Fighter Experimental or TFX for short It did not take long for the services to convince Secretary McNamara that the close air support mission requirement could not be satisfied by the TFX and the Marine Corps and the Army were dropped from the program at an early stage However Secretary McNamara stuck doggedly to his idea of maximum commonality between USAF and Navy versions of the TFX and in June 1961 he instructed the Air Force and the Navy to work closely together to combine their requirements before issuing a joint RFP Although both the USAF and the Navy thought that this idea was completely unrealistic Secretary McNamara was the boss and they reluctantly followed orders Both the USAF and the Navy agreed that the use of variable geometry wings would be a good idea However on just almost everything else they differed substantially The Navy favored side by side seating for its FAD fighter whereas the Air Force preferred tandem seating The Navy wanted an aircraft equipped with a long range search and intercept radar having a dish 48 inches in diameter whereas the Air Force needed an aircraft equipped with a terrain following radar optimized for low altitude operations The Navy wanted an aircraft that was optimized for long loiter times at medium to high altitudes at subsonic speeds whereas the Air Force insisted on an aircraft capable of low altitude operations and supersonic dash performance Undaunted Secretary McNamara pressed forward with the project and directed that the Air Force would be the lead service for the development of a common TFX aircraft By August of 1961 the Secretary of the Navy reported to Secretary McNamara that the compromise TFX design could not meet the Navy requirements The Air Force wanted an aircraft weighing 75 000 pounds gross while the Navy wanted the gross weight to be kept below 50 000 pounds In addition carrier operational requirements necessitated that the overall length be kept below 56 feet so that it could fit aboard existing carrier elevators McNamara ordered the Navy to accept a design sized to accommodate a 36 inch radar rather than the 48 inch radar it really wanted and to accept a gross takeoff weight of 55 000 pounds On September 29 1961 a new Request For Proposals was issued to Boeing General Dynamics Lockheed Northrop Grumman McDonnell Douglas North American and Republic The Air Force s version of the TFX was to be designated F 111A with the Navy s version being designated F 111B In the spirit of commonality the Air Force and Navy versions did not carry separate designation schemes Nine responses were received in early December of 1961 Only Northrop turned down the invitation to submit a proposal In their first evaluation of the proposals on January 19 1962 the Air Force Selection Board and a Navy representative endorsed the Boeing proposal but the Air Force Council rejected the Boeing bid as requiring much more work In late January of 1962 both the Air Force and Navy agreed that none of the proposals were really acceptable but that two of them the Boeing and General Dynamics proposals warranted further study A letter contract was issued to each company requesting more design data In the spring of 1962 Boeing and General Dynamics submitted second proposals In May of 1962 both the Air Force and Navy Secretaries rejected the two contractor s second proposals for lack of sufficient data A third submission took place in late June At this time the Air Force endorsed the Boeing proposal but the Navy was unhappy with their version and refused to commit themselves A frustrated Secretary McNamara ordered a final competition for later that year on the basis of a point system for categories based on performance cost and commonality Boeing and General Dynamics resubmitted their final proposals in September of 1962 The Air Force Council the Air Force Logistics Command and the Bureau of Naval Weapons the Navy organization which had replaced the Bureau of Aeronautics in 1959 all indicated that they preferred the Boeing design but on November 24 1962 the Defense Department announced that the General Dynamics design had been selected The reason given for the selection of the General Dynamics proposal was its promised greater degree of commonality and its supposedly more realistic approach to the

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